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Stephens: A Hard Pill to Swallow

A HARD PILL TO SWALLOW: SYMPTOMS AND PROGNOSIS OF
THE DRUG MANUFACTURER PREEMPTION DEFENSE IN 2018

Brandon Stephens *
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Hatch-Waxman Act 1 (HWA) was enacted to facilitate
rapid availability of affordable generic drugs to the public by sparing
manufacturers the cost and risk associated with a protracted
application process. 2 While the HWA has certainly proliferated
generic drug availability, an externality arising from interpretative
caselaw has had the unintended consequence of absolving generic
manufacturers from tort liability. 3 Plaintiffs injured by generic drugs
have found it exceedingly difficult to recover for their injuries in
recent years due to interpretative caselaw concerning manufacturer
preemption doctrine. 4 A new branch of preemption defense even
emerged around 2016 which extends manufacturer preemption
protection to brand-name manufacturers. 5 This note explores the
progeny of the pharmaceutical manufacturer preemption defense, its
origination from the U.S. Supreme Court’s application of the HatchWaxman Act’s provisions, and a prediction about the preemption
doctrine’s direction in light of recent cases and the Trump
administration. It argues that the Supreme Court erroneously
deferred to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on issues of
*J.D.,

Touro Law Center, 2018. Brandon Stephens is a graduate of the two-year accelerated
program. He would like to thank Professor Rena Seplowitz, Law Review Managing Editor
Luann Dallojacono, and Law Review Editor-in-Chief Michael J. Borger for their assistance
with this note.
1 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981, 98 Pub. L. No. 417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
2 See infra Part II.
3 See infra Part III.
4 See infra Part IV.
5 See infra Part V. A.

689

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 2 [2018], Art. 17

690

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

preemption and interpretation of law, and that the FDA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying generics the ability to
unilaterally change their labels. Lastly, this note concludes with an
argument that all manufacturers should be subject to the same duty to
strengthen labels and liability for defective designs.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND ITS
EFFECTS

The Hatch-Waxman Act 6 amended the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1984 to expedite patient access to
affordable generic drugs by making them available upon the
expiration of brand-name patents. 7 Generic manufacturers can
“essentially piggy-back on a pioneer drug’s human clinical trials and
labeling” 8 by filing an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA)
with the FDA. 9 The ANDA process spares generic manufacturers
from performing redundant and considerably expensive clinical trials
required of new drug applications (NDA). 10 The intent of Congress
was to incentivize rapid entry into the generic market and to drive
prices down with competition. 11 Generics are identical to brandname drugs except for substituted binders and fillers; ANDAs require
that a generic drug precisely matches its brand-name referent in
active ingredients, dosage form, route of administration,
bioequivalence, and label indications. 12 Inactive ingredients added to
generics (such as fillers and binders) can create minor variability but
are essentially identical. 13 In this respect, the HWA has been
enormously successful in achieving patient access to affordable
generic drugs.
However, discovery of latent health effects of drugs can take
years or even decades to become apparent. These revelations can
6 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981, 98 Pub. L. No. 417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
7 SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare v. Watson Pharms., 211 F.3d 21, 26 (2d Cir.
2000).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id..
11 Id.
12 SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare v. Watson Pharms., 211 F.3d 21, 26 (2d
Cir. 2000).
13 What are Generic Drugs and Are They Safe?, CONSUMER REPORTS (Published: Aug.
2012), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2012/08/are-generic-drugs-safe/index.html.
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occur long after a brand-name manufacturer has exited the market.
However, only brand-name manufacturers are permitted to update
label precautions according to FDA rules and doctrine. 14 Such
unilateral changes must be accompanied by a “changes being
effected” (CBE) submission to the FDA detailing the changes. 15
Generic manufacturers, on the other hand, are not permitted to make
unilateral label changes without prior authorization, according to the
FDA’s interpretation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
as affirmed by the Supreme Court, 16 although generics are similarly
obligated to report adverse events. 17 Therefore, no meaningful
incentive exists for generic manufacturers to petition the FDA to
permit stronger labels, and following a brand-name manufacturer’s
departure from the market, there is no one piloting the amendment
process towards safer destinations.
Between 2004 and 2018, 8,068,279 reports of adverse side
effects were submitted to the FDA. 18 Generics now constitute eightyeight percent of the United States pharmaceutical market; 19 therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that generics are a significant contributor to
adverse events based on their overall market share. In spite of this
alarming trend, both brand-name and generic drug manufacturers are
effectively immune from state torts such as failure-to-warn and
defective design claims. 20
Provided that manufacturers have
complied with FDA rules enacted pursuant to federal law, tort claims
challenging label or design sufficiency are preempted. 21
III.

GENESIS OF GENERIC DRUG MANUFACTURER PREEMPTION
DEFENSE AND ITS FLAWS

In the first case in which the Supreme Court considered
pharmaceutical preemption, it concluded that Congress did not intend

14

See infra Part III. B.
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 568 (2009).
16 PLIVA v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 614-15 (2011).
17 Id. at 630-33 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
18 Who
Reports Adverse Events?, U.S FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
https://open.fda.gov/drug/event/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).
19 The Generic Drug Approval Process, U.S FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/NewsEvents/ucm508150.htm, (page last updated: 11/28/2017).
20 See infra Part III.
21 See infra Part III.
15
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the FDCA to preempt state tort law. 22 It also determined that
impossibility preemption is a demanding affirmative defense that
shifts the burden to the defendant to demonstrate impossibility
through clear evidence. 23 However, the two subsequent Supreme
Court decisions concerning manufacturer preemption in the context
of generics eroded consumer protection by imposing impossibility
preemption. 24 At present, generic manufacturers owe consumers no
ostensible tort duties. 25 In both of the most recent manufacturer
preemption cases, Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, saying that
precedent has been ignored and lamenting about the policy
ramifications. 26
A.

Clear Evidence Of Impossibility Originally
Required For Preemption Defense

The first in the trilogy of formative drug manufacturer
preemption defense cases, Wyeth v. Levine, 27 was a 6-3 decision and
the most pro-consumer of the three. The majority of the Supreme
Court in Levine held that the FDCA preserves tort suits and that
federal law did not preempt plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim against
the brand-name manufacturer because it was possible for the
manufacturer to comply with both state tort standards and federal
obligations imposed by FDA rules. 28
The plaintiff suffered
irreversible corrosion from the direct arterial administration of the
manufacturer’s drug, Phenergan. 29 A physician administered the
drug through a high-risk IV-push method rather than a safer IV-drip,
which plaintiff alleged was not sufficiently warned of on the label.30
The drug caused the patient to develop gangrene, resulting in the
amputation of her arm. 31 The FDA had authorized the sale of the

22

See infra Part III. A.
See infra Part III. A.
24 See infra Parts III. B, C.
25 See infra Part III. B, C.
26 See infra Part III. B, C.
27 555 U.S. 555, 556 (2009) (Stevens delivered the opinion of the court in which Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Justice Alito delivered the dissent in which
Scalia and Roberts joined.).
28 Id. at 572-75.
29 Id. at 559.
30 Id. at 560.
31 Id. at 559.
23
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injectable drug in 1955, 32 and the defendant had been aware of the
danger of IV-push administration since 1967. 33 The Court reasoned
that the defendant had an affirmative duty under both state and
federal law to update its labels to reflect recently discovered IV-push
dangers and that there was no obstacle preemption, stating that “[i]n
keeping with Congress’ decision not to preempt common-law tort
suits, it appears that the FDA traditionally regarded state law as a
complementary form of drug regulation.” 34 The Court observed that
Congress recognizes that tort suits provide a vital role in protecting
consumers from previously unknown risks. 35 Tort suits also
incentivize product safety and require manufacturers, which have
superior knowledge, to take responsibility rather than rely on the
FDA, which is ill equipped to continuously monitor more than 11,000
approved drugs. 36 The Court held that “absent clear evidence that the
FDA would not have approved a change to Phenergan’s label, we
will not conclude that it was impossible for Wyeth to comply with
both federal and state requirements.” 37
In his dissent that would foreshadow cases to come, Justice
Samuel Alito framed the legal issue as a question of whether a
Vermont state jury should be empowered to substitute its opinion of
label adequacy for the considered and expert opinion of the FDA. 38
Justice Alito relied heavily on a previous decision in Geier v.
American Honda Motor Company 39 for the proposition that state tort
law can never modify an agency’s safety determinations. 40 However,
Geier differed from Levine in an essential respect. In Geier, the
plaintiff’s claim that the manufacturer was negligent for failing to
install an airbag presented a direct obstacle to the options for
compliance provided in the agency rule, which the agency
deliberately anticipated to permit a gradual, mixed fleet of passive
restraints to allow for experimentation with safety standards. 41
Levine was not obstacle preempted because the FDCA’s manifest
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Levine, 555 U.S. at 561.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 569, 578.
Id. at 579.
Id.
Levine, 555 U.S. at 571.
Id. at 605 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
Levine, 555 U.S. at 621 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 579, 580.
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objective was to promote drug manufacturers’ continuous
responsibility for product safety by leaving state tort suits intact. 42
The FDCA allows pharmaceutical drugs to be sold upon meeting an
initial threshold of safety, but with the caveat that they are
succeptible to future charges of misbranding and mandatory label
changes. 43
The FDA rules create a CBE pathway to label
strengthening that manufacturers are obligated to follow, reinforcing
the clear federal objective to place the onus on manufacturers to bear
responsibility for their labels at all times.
Geier also acknowledged that state tort suits directed at
specific models of cars that pose unique safety risks may not pose an
obstacle to a broadly applying agency rule. 44 This reasoning as
applied to Levine suggests that although a label may be sufficient in
most cases, it might be flawed with respect to particular indications
or uses in predisposed populations. Additionally, the potential for
state torts to present an obstacle to agency rules is far narrower with
pharmaceuticals because the sufficiency of labels varies with each
individual case, whereas a tort duty to impose airbags in cars is
mutual to all manufacturers in that state and therefore supplants the
broader federal rule.
B.

Failure-to-Warn Preemption Defense for Generic
Manufacturers

Before the Supreme Court addressed generic manufacturer
preemption on writ of certiorari, the Eighth and Fifth Circuits first
confronted the issue and held that a generic manufacturer cannot
remain idle when on notice of a drug’s serious adverse effects. 45
Conflict preemption principles provided no help to generics of
nothing. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the generic manufacturer
defendant did not surmount Levine’s “clear evidence” of
impossibility requirement because the defendant failed to prove that
the FDA would have rejected a proposed label change, or that the
CBE process was foreclosed to them. 46 The Eighth Circuit also

42

Id. at 581.
Id. at 570, 571.
44 Geier, 529 U.S. at 885.
45 Mensing v. Wyeth, 588 F.3d 603, 608 (8th Cir. 2009); Demahy v. Actavis, 593 F.3d
428, 449 (5th Cir. 2010).
46 Mensing, 588 F.3d at 608.
43

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss2/17

6

Stephens: A Hard Pill to Swallow

2018

A HARD PILL TO SWALLOW

695

quickly dispatched any obstacle preemption challenge by observing
that Levine determined that tort suits are not an obstacle to the goal of
the FDCA: “[a]fter Wyeth, we must view with a questioning mind the
generic defendants’ argument that Congress silently intended to grant
the manufacturers of most prescription drugs blanket immunity from
state tort liability when they market inadequately labeled products.”47
The Fifth Circuit similarly applied Levine’s “clear evidence”
impossibility preemption standard and discussed “three avenues for
complying with both state and federal law: the CBE process, the prior
approval process, and letters sent directly to healthcare providers.”48
The court found no evidence of Congress’s “clear and manifest
purpose” to preempt, recognizing the historical context of the FDCA
disfavoring preemption and Congress’s omission of a preemption
provision. 49 The Fifth Circuit further explained that Congress could
not have implicitly intended to have a wanton rule which allowed
brand-name consumers to recover for injuries but provided no
remedy to generic consumers. 50
In a decision that surely astonished both the circuit courts and
plaintiffs, the Supreme Court in PLIVA v. Mensing 51 narrowed
Levine’s preemption exemption to brand-name manufacturers. 52 In
other words, the Court decided that generic manufacturers cannot be
subjected to failure-to-warn claims and extended a significant
immunity. In so doing, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits. 53 PLIVA was a 5-4 decision, with Justice Alito
joining the majority in holding that product liability claims against
generic manufacturers are preempted, even when the manufacturer
has notice of severe health risks and has neglected to act. 54 The
Court unquestioningly deferred to the FDA’s interpretation that an
original manufacturer has a duty to maintain the “adequacy” of label
warnings through the CBE process while a generic company has no
such affirmative obligations. 55 Under this premise, the Court held

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id. at 607.
Demahy, 593 F.3d at 445, 446.
Id. at 435, 448, 449.
Demahy, 593 F.3d at 449.
PLIVA v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 604 (2011).
Id. at 609, 624.
Id. at 626.
See id. at 625.
See id. at 614, 615.
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that a generic manufacturer is only “responsible for ensuring that its
warning label is the same as the brand name’s” at all times. 56
Even though the FDA foreclosed generic use of doctor letters
and the CBE process, it maintained that label adequacy is the
responsibility of the manufacturer which is under a constant duty to
petition the FDA to update labels upon discovery of adverse effects. 57
This would seemingly dispense with the defense that a defendant
manufacturer’s actions were physically impossible. Instead, the
Supreme Court expressed skepticism towards the FDA that such a
duty existed despite showing deference to the agency regarding
sameness requirements, and proceeded to conclude that even if the
duty existed, preemption analysis forbids consideration of scenarios
that reconcile federal and state law. 58 According to the Court’s
reasoning, the defendant established an impossibility preemption
defense because in order to strengthen its labels sufficiently to avoid
state tort liability, it would have needed to consult the FDA; thus
independent compliance was allegedly “impossible.” 59
PLIVA turned manufacturer preemption defense on its head.
What began in Levine as an onerous affirmative defense requiring
“clear and convincing evidence” of physical impossibility instead
became an automatic and impregnable barrier to tort suit against
generics. The Court in PLIVA reconciled Levine by reducing it to a
brief paragraph at the end of the opinion. 60 The Court notably
glossed over the “clear evidence” burden of pleading a preemption
defense and gave Levine the narrowest holding that preemption
exemption depends upon a manufacturer’s “unilateral” ability to
act. 61 The opinion supported this harsh constraint by hyperbole that
without a categorical rule, the supremacy clause would be rendered

56

PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 613.
Id. at 616.
58 Id. at 620.
59 PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 618.
60 “Wyeth is not to the contrary. In that case, as here, the plaintiff contended that a drug
manufacturer had breached a state tort-law duty to provide an adequate warning label. The
Court held that the lawsuit was not pre-empted because it was possible for Wyeth, a brandname drug manufacturer, to comply with both state and federal law. Specifically, the CBE
regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii), permitted a brand-name drug manufacturer like
Wyeth ‘to unilaterally strengthen its warning’ without prior FDA approval. Thus, the federal
regulations applicable to Wyeth allowed the company, of its own volition, to strengthen its
label in compliance with its state tort duty.” Id. at 624, 625. (internal citations omitted).
61 Id.
57
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“illusory” and “meaningless.” 62 Where federal law and state law can
hypothetically conflict, state law is preempted despite identifiable
courses of action that could lead to their agreement.
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor highlighted several flaws in
the majority’s reasoning. Sotomayor mentioned that Congress
omitted a federal remedy from the FDCA precisely because it
understood that state tort law complements the FDCA and
accompanying rules, not because it intended to deprive injured
consumers of a remedy. 63 She explained that public health and
safety are traditional state “police powers,” and in the absence of an
express intention by Congress, there is a presumption against
usurping the states’ historic abilities. 64 She pointed out that
hypothetical impossibility of complying with state and federal law is
not sufficient to invoke a drastic remedy like preemption; rather,
conflict must be actual and impossibility literal. 65 A defendant
pleading the affirmative defense bears the burden of showing
unavoidable conflict resulting in physical impossibility, 66 though no
such showing was made or demanded of defendant in PLIVA.
Sotomayor also discussed a logical inconsistency in the
majority’s premise that impossibility preemption in the context of
failure-to-warn claims turns on whether a manufacturer can
“unilaterally” act independently of FDA consultation. She explained
that brand-name amendments are not truly unilateral either because
their approval ultimately depends on FDA ratification, just as a
generic manufacturer’s petition to amend its label can be denied by
the FDA. 67 Sotomayor contended that generic label liability is not a
novel concept in the record, as generic defendants already have an
FDA-recognized duty to monitor and report instances of adverse
reactions and vigilantly propose label changes. 68
Sotomayor is convincing. The distinction between generic
and brand-name manufacturers with respect to legal impossibility is
arbitrary because both manufacturers are empowered to take
corrective action that ultimately relies on FDA approval. Simply
62

Id. at 620.
PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 643 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan).
64 Id. at 637, 638, 641.
65 PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 626, 627 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 634.
67 Id. at 635, 636.
68 Id. at 631, 632.
63
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because brand-name manufacturers can initiate proposed changes
does not make their capacity to act more convincingly “possible”
than generic manufacturers that can, and indeed are obligated to,
attempt changes. Liability is the most appropriate enforcement
mechanism to ensure generic manufacturers are honoring this duty
because it creates a significant financial motive to be proactive in
order to avoid costly and embarrassing suits.
C.

Generic Manufacturers Absolved of Liability for
Selling Defective Products

In another 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court in Mutual
Pharmaceutical Company v. Bartlett 69 revisited generic manufacturer
preemption defense in the context of defective-design torts. 70 Justice
Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that generic
manufacturer preemption extends to design-defect claims since
generics are under a duty of sameness with respect to both design and
label. 71 The plaintiff ingested generic sulindac for shoulder pain and
developed “a horrendous disease that caused sixty to sixty-five
percent of the plaintiff’s skin to either burn off or turn into an open
wound. The plaintiff was left severely disfigured and nearly blind.”72
A toxicologist testified at trial that the manufacturer knew that
sulindac posed a higher risk of toxic epidermal necrosis and StevensJohnson Syndrome than other available drugs evidenced by incident
reports to the FDA, and that sulindac had a similar safety profile to
another NSAID withdrawn from the market for misbranding. 73 A
jury found the drug to be unreasonably dangerous and defective as
designed under the state’s risk-utility analysis, which included label
sufficiency among the factors to consider. 74 The Court of Appeals
affirmed and the Supreme Court reversed, finding claim preemption
because generic manufacturers can neither redesign a drug nor

69

Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
71 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474-77.
72 Guidry v. Janssen Pharms., No. 15-4591 SECTION F, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115447,
at **32 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2016) (giving a concise and poignant description of Bartlett’s
facts).
73 Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 35 (5th Cir. 2012).
74 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2476.
70
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change its label to avoid state liability. 75 The Court shirked
responsibility by blaming Congress for the “tragic circumstances.” 76
In an apparent effort to downplay the obvious breadth and
considerable harm to consumers, Justice Alito qualified the decision
with dicta that purported to offer two viable claims. The first
potentially viable claim parallels the misbranding statute which
forbids the sale of a drug that is unreasonably dangerous even when
used in the manner and dosage ordinarily prescribed. 77
The construction of state law necessary to invoke the
misbranding statute protection is unclear, because plaintiff effectively
made this argument by presenting expert testimony that sulindac
shared a profile of danger similar to other drugs withdrawn from the
market. Presumably Alito meant that a state tort claim must
explicitly adopt the federal misbranding statute as a statutory tort in
order to avoid preemption, since he refused to recognize market
withdrawal as an option that overcomes impossibility preemption
even under circumstances suggestive of misbranding. 78 If market
withdrawal could overcome impossibility preemption, we would see
prospectively misbranded products removed by manufacturers at an
earlier stage to reduce liability exposure. This approach would
further the HWA’s consumer-oriented purpose. At present, the
misbranding statute relies on ex post facto tort suits and FDA action
for teeth.
Justice Alito also suggested that a state’s imposition of
absolute liability rather than strict liability may not be preempted.79
According to Justice Alito, this avoids impossibility preemption
because a generic manufacturer would have no “affirmative duties”
that could conflict with federal obligations. 80 However, the Supreme
Court would undoubtedly deem strict liability state torts to be
obstacle preempted. Imposing strict liability on generic companies
would undermine the generic market and create a far more overt
obstacle to the HWA than standard tort liability. Manufacturers
would have no means of defense and would be subjected to a

75

Id. at 2475.
Id. at 2480 (Alito, J., delivering the opinion of the court) (joined by Justices Roberts,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas).
77 Id. at 2477 n.4.
78 Id. at 2477.
79 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473, 2474 n.1.
80 Id.
76
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constant barrage of automatic liability that would discourage market
participation and therefore undermine public access to generics.
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor reiterated many points from
her dissent in PLIVA 81 while addressing new concerns. She stated
that while state tort law only requires a liable manufacturer to
compensate victims, it imposes no affirmative actions that would
conflict with federal duties. 82 According to Sotomayor, a generic
manufacturer can avoid liability by voluntarily discontinuing sales in
the forum, paying damages, or even approaching the FDA. 83 She
took issue with the majority’s conflation of impossibility preemption
and obstacle preemption in rejecting the stop-selling rationale. 84
Sotomayor argued that impossibility preemption requires a thorough
evaluation of the pre- and post-market review framework for generics
and then contrasting them with state obligations, whereas the
majority purports to invoke impossibility preemption but devotes the
bulk of its opinion to considering policy and historical contexts
characteristic of obstacle preemption analysis. 85 Sotomayor argued
that the majority rejected the stop-selling rationale under the bizarre
and inappropriately considered premise that Congress’s purpose
when enacting the FDCA was to grant a license to generic
manufacturers to sell unreasonably dangerous drugs without tort
liability. 86
Sotomayor pointed out that even under obstacle preemption
(which was not an issue before the Court), the majority completely
ignored the savings clause added in the 1962 amendment to the
FDCA, which called for preemption only when there was a “direct
and positive” conflict with state law. 87 She asserted that the
majority’s conclusion is even more illogical because manufacturers
have the resources, responsibility, and greater access to health-related
information than the FDA, which is incapable of vigilantly
monitoring thousands of drugs. 88 Sotomayor also pointed out that the
majority deferred to the FDA’s “close call” decision of the

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

See infra Part III. B.
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2487-90.
Id. at 2491.
Id. at 2493-96.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2484.
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2485.
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preemptive effect of its own rules, despite the Supreme Court’s
consistently holding that an agency declaring preemptive effect
without congressional invitation is entitled to little weight. 89 Lastly,
Sotomayor mentioned the greatest concern about the majority’s
reasoning is that holding premarket FDA review to have preemptive
effect would imply that torts against brand-name manufacturers are
also preempted. 90 This turns out to have been an accurate
prediction. 91
IV.

THEORIES OF RECOVERY IN THE AFTERMATH OF GENERIC
MANUFACTURER TORT PREEMPTION

Fraud has had some success as a stand-alone recovery theory
for injured patients post-PLIVA/Bartlett. Misbranding is also
emerging as a potential loophole to generic manufacturer preemption,
but that means that a drug must be unreasonably dangerous for any
approved purpose, even as prescribed.
Therefore, uniquely
predisposed populations are without recourse, which defies
fundamental tort principles like the eggshell plaintiff rule and duty
assigned by contract. In general, remedies are inconsistently applied
and often deprive injured patients of redress. Courts have generally
declined to shift responsibility to brand-name manufacturers when a
plaintiff has only ingested the generic version. Liability shifting,
however, is preferable to a complete bar on plaintiff recovery.
A.

Misbranding as a Means of Introducing “Parallel”
State Claims Against Generics

As the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
pointed out in a 2014 case, Bartlett leads to the ironic and confusing
implication that a parallel state law requiring a dangerous generic
drug be taken off the market may actually avoid conflict with federal
labeling rules, whereas a state tort law indirectly having the same
effect is preempted by the Hatch-Waxman Act:
In Bartlett, the Supreme Court expressly noted an
exception for state-law claims that parallel the federal
misbranding statute. (“We do not address state design89
90
91

Id. at 2494.
Id. at 2494-95.
See infra Part V.A.
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defect claims that parallel the federal misbranding
statute.”). The federal statute requires a manufacturer
to pull a drug from the market (even though approved
by the FDA) if it is “dangerous to health” even when
used in accordance with the FDA-approved directions.
This exception only applies where the plaintiff’s claim
is based on scientific information that was not
available when the FDA approved the drug. 92
Therefore, a narrow exception to generic manufacturer preemption
exists when a plaintiff can demonstrate that the drug in question is
misbranded for any approved use based upon information obtained
post-approval, and state law imposes a similar duty. The definition
section of the Hatch-Waxman Act describes some of the criteria to be
considered in evaluating whether a drug is misbranded; both implied
and express misrepresentations of material consequences from
regularly prescribed use are relevant. 93 However, the FDCA
provisions do not provide a private cause of action. State negligence
laws modeled on federal misbranding will still be preempted,
whereas negligence per se claims that integrate misbranding will be
more likely to survive. 94
B.

Courts Should Not Refuse to Shift Generic Failureto-Warn Liability to Brand-Name Manufacturers

The “overwhelming” majority of courts have declined to shift
liability for generic drug-related injuries to brand-name
manufacturers under any theory of liability due to either a lack of

92 Gannon v. Bayer Healthcare Pharms., Inc. (In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg.,
Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. 3:13-cv-10143-DRH-PMF, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56862, at *31 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2014) (internal citations omitted).
93 21 U.S.C.S. § 321 (n): “If an article is alleged to be misbranded because the labeling or
advertising is misleading, then in determining whether the labeling or advertising is
misleading there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only representations
made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, or any combination thereof, but also
the extent to which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal facts material in the light of
such representations or material with respect to consequences which may result from the use
of the articles to which the labeling or advertising relates under the conditions of use
prescribed in the labeling or advertising thereof or under such conditions of use as are
customary or usual.”
94 Gwendolyn McKee, Injury Without Relief: The Increasing Reluctance of Courts to
Allow Negligence Per Se Claims Based On Violations of FDA Regulations, 83 UMKC L.
REV. 161, 171 (2014).
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privity or obvious attempts to circumvent preemption. 95 An outlier
case shifted total liability onto the brand-name manufacturer for offlabel use, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff ingested only the
generic version. Christmas came a few days early for plaintiffs on
December 21, 2017 in T.H. v. Novartis, 96 a case where the California
high court boldly acknowledged that no other jurisdiction has
recognized such expansive brand-name duties. 97 The court held that
brand-name manufacturers are liable for failing to amend their labels
to reflect known risks even when plaintiff only consumed the generic
version and the defendant has since exited the market. 98 In T.H.,
plaintiffs suffered serious and sustained neurological damage while in
the womb when their mother took a generic drug for the off-label
purpose of preventing premature labor contractions. 99 The court
reasoned that because only brand-name manufacturers may
unilaterally add or strengthen warning indications that apply to
generics, they therefore bear the fault for failing to update labels to
reflect foreseeable risks known to them and may not avoid liability
by offloading their business. 100
The court reached the right decision. Holding brand-name
manufacturers liable for generic torts is of course not ideal, but given
the preemption landscape, it is the most nearly fair option. Brandname manufacturers are exclusively responsible for the ongoing
adequacy of their labels, which affect the labeling requirements of
generic manufacturers that must conform. Brand-name manufacturers
ought to bear both the risk as well as the reward for their products.
By the time generics enter the market, a brand-name manufacturer
will already have enjoyed exclusive sales bestowed by their patent.
While holding brand-name manufacturers accountable as a last resort
might seem unfair, it is significantly worse policy to deprive
consumers of any tort rights. Creating a stronger impetus for brandname manufacturers to acknowledge and address safety defects will
force generic manufacturers to be more proactive in following suit.
Neglectful generics will appropriately be subjected to tort liability for

95
96
97
98
99
100

Germain v. Teva Pharms. USA., 756 F.3d 917, 938-39 (6th Cir. 2014).
407 P.3d 18 (Cal. 2017).
T.H., 407 P.3d at 22, 47.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 41, 43.
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their products, thereby absolving brand-name manufacturers of
culpability and reinforcing brand-name manufacturers’ vigilance.
B.

Are Generic Manufacturers Liable for Fraudulent
and Unapproved Off-label Promotion?

It is estimated that nearly twenty percent of prescriptions are
for off-label uses and doctors are free to prescribe medications for
off-label purposes. 101 Off-label prescriptions include the use of socalled “orphan drugs,” or drugs that treat individuals with rare
conditions but do not have a large enough market to justify
undergoing the costly FDA approval process. 102 According to the
U.S. General Accounting Office, one-third of cancer drugs are orphan
drugs, and half of all cancer patients take at least one orphan
medication. 103
As discussed, an overwhelming majority of courts have held
that a brand-name drug manufacturer may not be liable under any
theory of tort liability when the plaintiff was injured by a generic
counterpart, even in the case of off-label marketing facilitated by the
brand-name manufacturer. 104 However, in Priest v. Sandoz 105 the
District Court of Texas, joining several other district courts, refused
defendant manufacturer’s defense that off-label promotion claims
against it were preempted. 106 Unfortunately, the court in Sandoz still
held that plaintiffs insufficiently pled their claims. 107 According to
the court, off-label promotion must meet heightened Rule 9(b)
pleading standards: “[P]laintiff may have an off-label promotion
claim if the plaintiff alleges that the manufacturer influenced the
prescribing physician to prescribe the patient off-label amiodarone or
if the plaintiff alleges the manufacturer concealed the risks of offlabel use of amiodarone.” 108 The rule requires a plaintiff to identify
the specific instances and content of alleged misrepresentations to
101

David Kwok, Controlling Excessive Off-Label Medicare Drug Costs Through the
False Claims Act, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 185, 193.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See supra Part IV. B
105 No. A-15-CV-00822-LY-ML, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186635 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 29,
2016).
106 Priest, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186635, at *18.
107 Id. at 33-38.
108 Priest, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186635, at *33-34.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss2/17

16

Stephens: A Hard Pill to Swallow

2018

A HARD PILL TO SWALLOW

705

their prescribing physician, along with the time, place, contents, and
responsible parties. 109 Although plaintiff’s off-label claim initially
escaped preemption dismissal, the plaintiff could not identify the
content or time of allegedly fraudulent statements. 110 It is difficult to
imagine how a plaintiff could have access to these marketing
materials at the pleading stage without allowing discovery to proceed
via interrogatories and subpoenas for marketing materials. If the
plaintiff had access to these materials, one could argue there would
be no suit since plaintiff would have already been on notice of the
dangers. Despite the viability of off-label fraud claims against
generics, premature dismissal under stringent pleading standards
offers plaintiffs little hope. Plaintiffs are left to rely on the
cooperation of doctors and the manufacturers themselves to furnish
materials necessary for developing their case.
V.

THE TRAJECTORY OF MANUFACTURER PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE

At present, the trajectory of manufacturer preemption does
not look hopeful for patients injured by pharmaceutical drugs. Most
troubling is that some recent cases have even found preemption
applicable to brand-name manufacturers. The FDA failed to consider
CBE for generic manufacturers as they were slated to do in April
2017. The appointments of Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch and
FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb under the Trump administration
provide uncertain opportunity for changing manufacturer preemption.
Dr. Gottlieb has been an opponent of altering generic preemption111
while Justice Gorsuch seems to disfavor unrestrained agency
deference. 112 This could be crucial because a close reading of the
FDA rules demonstrates the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously
in denying generic manufacturers the ability to make unilateral label
changes.

109
110
111
112

Id.
Id. at 37-38.
Infra Part V.B.
Infra Part V.B.
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District Court Division Over Preempting Design
Defect Claims Against Brand-Name Manufacturers

Post-approval-based design-defect theories are preempted
because changes to an approved brand-name formula are prohibited
after approval, as are dosage adjustments which require prior FDA
approval. 113 However, district courts have diverged on whether
defective design torts against brand-name manufacturers premised
upon a preapproval defective design theory are also preempted. 114 In
Yates v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, a case about a birth
control drug, the court relied upon Bartlett’s disavowal of the “stopselling rationale” in holding that the plaintiff’s preapproval defective
design claim against the brand-name manufacturer was preempted. 115
The court reasoned that plaintiff’s argument amounted to a stopselling claim because the premise was that the defective birth control
composition, “Ortho Evra,” was so foreseeably dangerous that it
should never have been brought to application before the FDA. 116
The court stated that to hold otherwise would call for speculation
over an alternate formula, its effects, and whether the FDA would
have approved the proposed formula. 117 This rationale is dubious.
All product liability claims based on defective design entail a
demonstration of safer alternatives, and it is not too attenuated to
envision a safer drug’s meeting FDA approval. 118
On the other hand, the district court in Guidry v. Janssen
Pharmaceuticals 119 held that defective design and failure-to-warn
claims against a brand-name manufacturer are not preempted by
federal law if the drug’s design (and label based thereon) was
“unreasonably risky” at the time of application: “The dispositive
question presented here is simply: Can a drug manufacturer
independently design a reasonably safe drug in compliance with its
state-law duties before seeking FDA approval? The answer is
yes.” 120 This holding is aligned with Levine and common sense.
113

Yates v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., 808 F.3d 281, 298 (6th Cir. 2015).
Young v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, No. 4:16-CV-00108-DMB-JMV, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24730, at *17-22 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 22, 2017).
115 Yates, 808 F.3d at 300.
116 See id.
117 Id. at 299-300.
118 Young, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24730, at *18-20.
119 Guidry v. Janssen Pharms., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1187 (E.D. La. 2016).
120 Id. at 1207-08.
114
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Nothing in the FDCA alludes to construing the FDA’s permission to
sell a new drug as an absolute defense to liability. Underlying
generic preemption is a policy to incentivize generic manufacturers to
rapidly enter the market with a low barrier to entry to compensate for
enhanced competition. Brand-name manufacturers, on the other
hand, are not as vulnerable because they typically enjoy a patent
monopoly on their product in which to recoup their investment.
Therefore, the same need for protective preemption defense does not
exist for brand-name manufacturers.
B.

Trump Administration and Manufacturer
Preemption Defense

A proposed amendment to the FDA’s rules, 78 Fed. Reg.
67985, would enable unilateral label changes to be made by generic
manufacturers. 121 The rule was proposed in 2013 presumably as a
response to PLIVA and Bartlett, though it has yet to be ratified
despite an April 2017 consideration deadline. 122
The FDA
supposedly still plans to issue a final rule despite ardent manufacturer
lobbying against it, but has yet to do so as the proposed rule yields to
more “immediate priorities.” 123 Unfortunately, the rule appears
destined for the FDA’s proposed rules archive for the foreseeable
future. The Trump administration’s FDA Commissioner, Dr.
Gottlieb, has been an outspoken opponent of any rule that would
enable unilateral labeling change by manufacturers, believing them to
endanger access to generic drugs by a proliferation of litigation. 124
Prior to assuming the role of commissioner, he condoned off-label
advertisement, and since becoming commissioner, he has issued few
letters of admonishment for such practices. 125 Furthermore, Gottlieb
121

Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67985, 67989 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013).
122 Erin Bosman, Julie Park, Brittany Scheinok, Trump’s Nominee for FDA Commissioner
Likely Dooms Generic Drug Labeling Rule, CLASS DISMISSED (March 30, 2017),
http://classdismissed.mofo.com/product-liability/trumps-nominee-for-fda-commissionerlikely-dooms-generic-drug-labeling-rule/.
123 Brownwyn Mixter, FDA’s Generic Drug Labeling Rule Delayed Again, BLOOMBERG
BNA: HEALTH CARE BLOG (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.bna.com/fdas-generic-drugb73014462786/.
124 See Bosman et. al., Trump’s Nominee.
125 Sheila Kaplan and Katie Thomas, F.D.A. Chief Goes Against the Administration
Stereotype, N.Y. TIMES: HEALTH (Feb. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/11/
health/gottlieb-fda-drugs.html.
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has been vocal about making generic drugs more affordable by
expediting the approval process and has even publicly condemned
brand-name companies that will not offer generic manufacturers
samples of their drugs for development. 126 While making generics
more affordable clearly benefits the public, implementing such
measures without addressing manufacturer preemption will also
increase the growing number of uncompensated pharmaceutical drug
victims. Nevertheless, Gottlieb has acquired a reputation for being
responsive to both consumer and pharmaceutical interests. 127
However, for that same reason, already proposed policies that harm
the bottom line of generic manufacturers are unlikely to be followed
up by a generic CBE rule that exposes manufacturers to tort liability
as well.
The trajectory of the manufacturer preemption defense from a
judicial perspective is more hopeful when considering Justice
Gorsuch’s skeptical views on agency deference may lead him to
reject the manufacturer preemption defense. In a previous opinion,
Gorsuch asserted that a judicially created doctrine on administrative
law affords too much power to administrative agencies to interpret
the law, which is the domain of the court:
Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies
to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and
legislative power and concentrate federal power in a
way that seems more than a little difficult to square
with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe
the time has come to face the behemoth. 128
Still, it is difficult to infer too much about his potential views on
manufacturer preemption from this observation. In Caplinger v.
Medtronic, 129 Gorsuch declined to defer to the FDA’s most recent
position on the preemptive effect of the Medical Device Act’s
provisions, as the FDA had contradicted an earlier pronouncement on
the issue. 130 Gorsuch would likely be skeptical of the FDA’s
committed position in manufacturer preemption doctrine given that

126

Id.
Id.
128 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
129 784 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 2015).
130 Caplinger, 784 F.3d at 1346.
127
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the agency has been inconsistent on the subject. 131 In fact, the FDA’s
offered interpretation for disallowing a generic manufacturer to
unilaterally invoke the CBE process is actually contrary to a close
reading of its own rule. The Illinois District Court seemed to
recognize this back in 2009:
Although Congress intended for ANDA applicants to
submit identical labeling to the FDA when seeking
ANDA approval--see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v)--the
statute is silent as to the manufacturer’s obligation
after the ANDA is granted. But 21 C.F.R. § 314.97 is
not silent--it states that generic drug manufacturers are
obligated to comply with the same CBE provisions as
brand-listed manufacturers are. 132
The “sameness requirement” applies to an initial, preapproval ANDA
application to assure conformity with a drug already presumed to be
safe. 133 The FDA’s own rule on post-approval ANDA changes 134
explicitly incorporates the labeling changes section from which the
CBE rule derives. 135 The FDA therefore violated its own rules
arbitrarily and capriciously by excluding generics from CBE without
formal amendment, a consideration overlooked by the Supreme Court
in deferring to the FDA’s inconsistent views.
However, a proper interpretation of the FDA rule only defeats
impossibility preemption, but not necessarily obstacle preemption.
Caplinger also happens to be the most analogous preemption case
considered by Gorsuch involving state tort claims against a medical
device manufacturer for off-label advertising. 136 In following
precedent while interpreting the express preemption provision in the
Medical Device Act, Gorusch explained that even off-label state tort
suits impose additional or different safety requirements that trigger
obstacle preemption. 137 Applying this reasoning to manufacturer
preemption would suggest that Gorsuch would agree with the
131

Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2481-82 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Stacel v. Teva Pharms., 620 F. Supp. 2d 899, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
133 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v).
134 21 C.F.R. § 314.97(a): “General requirements. The applicant must comply with the
requirements of §§ 314.70 and 314.71 regarding the submission of supplemental ANDAs
and other changes to an approved ANDA.”
135 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii).
136 Caplinger, 784 F.3d at 1336-37.
137 Id. at 1345.
132
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holdings in PLIVA and Bartlett that state tort suits impose an obstacle
to federal objectives. However, Gorsuch took care in Caplinger to
qualify that the holding was compelled by the express preemption
provision within the Medical Device Act, and referred to the
In visiting
legislative history to support that conclusion. 138
manufacturer preemption, Gorsuch would likely give special
consideration to the relevant savings clause and legislative history
that support the preservation of state tort suits. 139 Therefore, Justice
Gorsuch’s views seem to offer a possible prospect for overturning
generic manufacturer preemption if the Court reaches obstacle
preemption .
VI.

CONCLUSION

Bartlett and PLIVA should be overruled as contrary to the
FDCA and the precedent established by the pioneer case, Levine. In
the alternative, the Supreme Court should reconsider the deference
given to the FDA’s inconsistent statements on generic CBE and
failure to observe its own rules. If the Supreme Court will not take
action, the FDA should pass a rule permitting generics to make
unilateral changes or stating that consultation should not be construed
as creating impossibility preemption. Justice Sotomayor pointed out
many of the failings of generic manufacturer preemption that
seemingly disregard the FDCA’s savings clause and congressional
intent to preserve state torts as determined in Levine. 140 The result
has effectually afforded drug manufacturers a license to sell
dangerous products free from liability.
The goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase consumer
confidence in generics, promote public health, and create
uniformity. 141 There is no sounder and more sensible way to
accomplish this than to subject all manufacturers to the same
expectations, rights, and duties of care. If inconsistent label
enhancements are a concern, the FDA can consolidate them and issue
notices to all manufacturers to compel unanimous adherence. Noncompliant manufacturers will be subjected to a prima facie case of
negligence, thereby enhancing safety while making recovery for
138
139
140
141

Id. at 1346-47.
See supra Part III. A.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.A.
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plaintiffs easier. As for design defects, there is no meaningful
difference between other product defect cases and pharmaceutical
defect cases in particular. In fact, the pervasive use of pharmaceutical
products should reinforce the need for design scrutiny. Moreover,
generic manufacturers should share responsibility for defective
design liability. The notion that generic manufacturers are helpless
belies the fact that market acquisition is a strategic business decision
with inherent risks based on available market data and capable of
hedging and insuring against.
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